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Abstract
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S ⊂
N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth
depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \S will do, which in turn
depends on which coalition structure the outsiders will form. Since this
coalition formation problem is NP-hard, various approaches have been
adopted. In this paper using an evolutionary game theoretic approach
we provide a set of equations that can help agents in S reason about the
coalition structures the outsiders may form in terms of minimum distances
on an n− s dimensional space, where n = |N |, s = |S|.
1 Introduction
Coalition Formation in Cooperative Games with Externalities constantly attract
the interest of economists. In these games due to cognitive constraints, the
members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional actions of the
non-members. This is because deducing the coalitional actions in a game with
many players is computationally cumbersome. In [1] it is shown that for an
n-player game the number of different coalition structures is O(nn) and ω(n
n
2 ).
Hence, computing the coalition structure that the outsiders form is a particularly
difficult task (at least, for games with a large number of players). As a matter
of fact, the problem of finding the coalition structure that maximizes the sum of
all players’ payoffs is NP-hard [1]. Even finding sub-optimal solutions requires
the search of an exponential number of cases (e.g. [2, 3]).
In this work we propose a different approach for the coalition formation
problem, an Evolutionary approach, stimulated by the following idea (borrowing
from [4]):
Classical game theory deals with a rational individual, or ‘player’,
who is engaged in a given interaction or ‘game’ with other players
∗Author is with SimplyHeuristics, Chicago, IL 60631, USA
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and has to decide between different options, or ‘strategies’, in or-
der to maximise a ‘payoff’ which depends on the strategies of the
co-players (who, in turn, attempt to maximise their payoff). In
contrast, evolutionary game theory deals with entire populations of
players, all programmed to use some strategy (or type of behaviour).
Strategies with high payoff will spread within the population (this
can be achieved by learning, by copying or inheriting strategies, or
even by infection). The payoffs depend on the actions of the coplay-
ers and hence on the frequencies of the strategies within the popu-
lation. Since these frequencies change according to the payoffs, this
yields a feedback loop. The dynamics of this feedback loop is the
object of evolutionary game theory.
In the rest of the paper and in section 2 we present our model, in section 3
we prove the results and in section 4 we conclude.
2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a number of agents cooperating in a market and let
S ⊂ N be a non-empty set of agents wishing not to cooperate with the rest.
Let N \S denote the outsiders. Agents in S are interested in knowing what the
outsiders N \ S will do upon deviation of S. Let n = |N | and s = |S|. Assume
that every agent is interchangeably the same as every other agent within the
outsiders (and within the whole set of agents in general). Each agent a ∈ N \S
has a number of choices to make as to which other agents in N \ S − {a} each
agent is going to cooperate with in order for the final coalition structure to form.
Since the n− s outsiders can be partitioned into disjoint subsets in Bn−s ways,
Bn−s being the (n− s)
th Bell number [5], each agent has Bn−s choices to follow
which reduce (upon symmetry) to n − s different choices since each agent has
n− s choices to belong in a coalition of size 1, · · · , n− s. The following example
explains the case for |N \ S| = 3 outsiders.
Example 2.1 Let N \ S = {a, b, c} be the set of the outsiders. Since there
exist B3 = 5 disjoint partitions (coalition structures) of N \ S, the choices si,
i = 1, · · · , 5 for agent a are:
s1: a stays a singleton when every other agent stays a singleton ({a}, {b}, {c}).
s2: a stays a singleton when every other agent stays together ({a}, {b, c}).
s3: a stays with all the rest ({a, b, c}).
s4: a stays with b when c stays a singleton ({a, b},{c}).
s5: a stays with c when b stays a singleton ({a, c},{b}).
If we now group these choices with respect to the size of the coalition a is a
member of, we will end up with 3 different groups of choices, (s1, s2), s3, (s4, s5).
This happens since a can belong to either a singleton, ({a}), a couple ({a, b} or
{a, c}) or a triple ({a, b, c}). Observe here that we do not group the coalition
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structures into similar ones, i.e. group 1=({a, b, c}), group 2=({{a, b},{c}},
{{a, c},{b}}, {{b, c},{a}}) and group 3=({{a}, {b}, {c}}) because we are inter-
ested in the decision of agent a with respect to what coalitional size it belongs
to. 
Now agents in S do the following in order to estimate what coalition structure
the outsiders will form. They take a very big collection C of multiple copies of
N \ S agents and force them to play the following game: Agents in this infinite
population interact in groups of N \S forming coalition structures from the set
of Bn−s possible ones. Then S observes the dynamics of the population and is
interested in the following quantity (called the replicator equation)
dxi
dt
= xi(vsi(a)− v˜) (1)
where xi is the frequency of choice si of agent a ∈ N \ S, vsi(a) is the
expected worth of a under choice si and v˜ the average worth of the population
1.
Assume that each frequency xi is a differentiable function of time t. As evolution
theory suggests (e.g. [6]) the above game has at least one Nash equilibrium
which happens when vsi(a)− v˜ = 0. Let us apply the above to our example of
N \ S = {a, b, c}.
Example 2.2 Since in the population we have B3 = 5 different coalition struc-
tures and also since we have symmetry ( i.e. v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) and
v({a, b}) = v({a, c}) = v({b, c})) the average equals to:
v˜ =
1
3 ·B3
(6v({a}) + 3v({a, b}) + v({a, b, c})) (2)
The replicator equation (1) has at least one Nash equilibrium which happens
when vsi(a)− v˜ = 0 or for our example when
vsi({a}) =
1
3 ·B3
(6v({a}) + 3v({a, b}) + v({a, b, c})) (3)
which gives a constraint for the outsiders that S should take into account.
As mentioned earlier there exist five choices for agent a but due to symmetry
we have that:
vs1 (a) = vs2(a) = v({a})
vs3 (a) =
v({a, b, c})
3
vs4(a) = vs5(a) =
v({a, b})
2
(4)
1In general with v(·) (with or without subscript) we denote the worth of the argument, the
argument being a coalition or a coalition structure.
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Using (4) in (3) we have:
9v({a})− 3v({a, b})− v({a, b, c}) = 0
−6v({a})− 3v({a, b}) + 4v({a, b, c}) = 0
−6v({a}) +
9
2
v({a, b})− v({a, b, c}) = 0 (5)
Equations (5) define three planes in 3-dimensional space (one dimension for
each size of a possible non-empty subset of {a, b, c}). Using simple geometric ar-
guments for every point P (x, y, z) in this space we can find the distances to these
planes. So if we know the profits of the coalitions v({a}), v({a, b}), v({a, b, c})
(or else if we can calculate the worth function v(·) of the outsiders) then it is
easy to calculate to which plane the worth function lies closer and thus argue
as to what coalition structure the outsiders will form. For example, for three
dimensions the point P (x, y, z) has the following distances from the above three
planes:
d{a} = 0.105|9x− 3y − z|
d{a,b,c} = 0.128|6x+ 3y − 4z|
d{a,b} = 0.132|6x− 4.5y + z|
So for a characteristic function2 with v({a}) = v({b}) = v({c}) = 0, v({a, b}) =
v({a, c}) = v({b, c}) = 1, v({a, b, c}) = 1, agents in S will compute that
min{d{a} = 0.419, d{a,b,c} = 0.128, d{a,b} = 0.463} = 0.128
and estimate that the coalition structure of the outsiders will be ({a, b, c}). 
Let us now generalize the above for the case of n− s outsiders.
3 Average worth
In order to generalize the method first we have to compute the average (per
agent) worth of the outsiders N \ S. For this we have the following
Proposition 3.1 Let v(j) denote the worth of a coalition of j outsiders3. The
average worth of the outsiders N \ S is
v˜ =
1
(n− s) · Bn−s
n−s∑
j=1
v(j)
(
n− s
j
)
Bn−s−j (6)
2Example borrowed from [7].
3we could have used v({1, · · · , j}) instead. From now on these two notations are used
interchangeably.
4
Proof : The N \ S outsiders can form Bn−s coalition structures in total. Say
v˜1, · · · , v˜Bn−s is an enumeration of the average worths of all these structures.
We have that:
v˜ =
Bn−s∑
j=1
v˜j
Bn−s
(7)
Every term v˜j is a sum of at most n − s worths and this has to be divided
by the number of the outsiders n− s.4
So the sum
Bn−s∑
j=1
v˜j is built from the terms
v(1)
n−s , · · · ,
v(n−s)
n−s , thus we can
write
Bn−s∑
j=1
v˜j =
1
n− s
n−s∑
k=1
wk · v(k) (8)
where each weight wk, k = 1, · · · , n−s denotes the multiplicity (the number
of appearances) of a coalition of size k among all the coalitions in all the coalition
structures.5
We now have to find these weights. To do this we can reason in the following
inductive way. Let us first find w1, i.e. the weight for the singletons. For
this we have to collect all the singletons from all the coalition structures. But
we have n − s different ways to choose a singleton from the outsiders since(
n−s
1
)
= n − s, and also the rest n − s − 1 of the outsiders can form Bn−s−1
different coalition structures. The above two combined give the weight for the
singletons w1 =
(
n−s
1
)
Bn−s−1. In the same way we can calculate w2: Since we
can choose in
(
n−s
2
)
ways a two-size coalition and the rest can form Bn−s−2
coalition structures, w2 =
(
n−s
2
)
Bn−s−2, etc.
So using the above reasoning we have that wk =
(
n−s
k
)
Bn−s−k and using
this in (8) and (7) we have the proposition. 
Example 3.2 Let us use proposition 1 to review our motivating example. For
this we have that n− s = 3 and B3 = 5. The average worth is
v˜ =
1
3 · 5
3∑
j=1
v(j)
(
3
j
)
B3−j =
1
3 · 5
(
3
1
)
B2v(1) +
(
3
2
)
B1v(2) +
(
3
3
)
B0v(3)
=
1
3 · 5
(3 · 2 · v(1) + 3 · 1 · v(2) + 1 · 1 · v(3))
4For example if a coalition structure has two structures {A} and {B} then its average worth
is (v({A})+v({B}))/(n−s), and if the coalition structure has only singletons then the average
worth would be a sum of n−s worths of singletons divided by n−s: v({1})+· · ·+v({1}))/(n−s)
etc.
5For example wn−s = 1 since there is only one coalition of size n−s among all the coalitions
in all the coalition structures.
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which is exactly the expression we found in the beginning. Also if we count
the multiplicities of singletons, 2-size sets etc. mentioned in Example 1, we
indeed find the same quantities. 
We continue with the following
Proposition 3.3 Each agent a ∈ N \ S has n− s different choices.
Proof : Trivially each agent can either exist as a singleton or in a pair or in
a triple etc. since the sizes of the non-empty subsets of N \S range in 1, · · · , n.

Let us order the n − s different choices of the agents with respect to the
size of the coalition agent a belongs to. Let s′1, · · · , s
′
n−s be such an ordering or
(s′j), 1 ≤ j ≤ n− s. Then we have the following proposition
Proposition 3.4 The average worth of an agent when choice s′j is adopted is
v(j)
j
.
Proof : Again trivially, being a member of a j sized coalition and splitting
profits equally gives agent a on average the worth of the coalition divided by
the number of agents in the coalition which is v(j)
j
. 
The following Theorem generalizes the method, giving a computational tool
to agents in S to reason about the outsiders
Theorem 3.5 When n− s outsiders are present, agents in S can reason about
the behavior of a ∈ N \ S using the following n− s equations
v(k)(
1
k
−
(
n− s
k
)
Bn−s−k
(n− s)Bn−s
) +
n−s∑
j=1,j 6=k
v(j)
(
n− s
j
)
Bn−s−j
(n− s)Bn−s
= 0
k = 1, · · · , n− s (9)
Proof : Using propositions 1 and 3 in the replicator equation and taking the
condition for a Nash equilibrium we get the result. 
Finally, the following Corollary of Theorem 1 concludes
Corollary 3.6 Given an allocation vector of worths (p(1), · · · , p(n−s)) for the
n− s outsiders, the following minimum gives a potential picture to agents in S
of the coalition structure the outsiders might form.
min
k


p(k)( 1
k
−
(
n−s
k
) Bn−s−k
(n−s)Bn−s
) +
n−s∑
j=1,j 6=k
p(j)
(
n−s
j
) Bn−s−j
(n−s)Bn−s√
n−s∑
j=1,j 6=k
((
n−s
j
) Bn−s−j
(n−s)Bn−s
)2
+ ( 1
k
−
(
n−s
k
) Bn−s−k
(n−s)Bn−s
)2


, k = 1, · · · , n− s
(10)
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4 Conclusion
In a set N of agents using an evolutionary approach to the coalition formation
problem a set of deviant agents S ⊂ N might face, we forced the outsiders N \S
to arbitrarily form coalition structures in an very big population of multiple
copies of N \ S. After computing the average worth of the outsiders we used
the replicator equation to reason about the potential coalition a single agent
a ∈ N \ S might belong to. This led to a set of n− s equations (hyperplanes).
If agents in S know or have an estimation of the worth of the outsiders, then
by computing the distances of this worth to the hyperplanes, they can reason
about the coalition structure the outsiders might form.
References
[1] 1. T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory and F. Tohme. Coali-
tion Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artificial Intelligence
111 (1-2), 209-238, 1999
[2] 2. K. Larson, T. Sandholm. Anytime coalition structure generation: an av-
erage case study Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
12 (1), 2000
[3] 3. S. She-Xiong, H. Shan-Li, S. Chun-Yi. Coalition structure generation
with worst case guarantees based on cardinality structure, Proceedings of the
6th International joint conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
systems (AAMAS ’07), Honolulu, Hawaii, 197 (1-3), 2007
[4] 4. J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary Game Dynamics. Bulletin of
the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 40 no. 4, 479-519, 2003
[5] 5. E. T. Bell. Exponential Numbers. American Mathematical Monthly, 41,
411-419, 1934
[6] 6. R. Cressman. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games. Cam-
bridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2003.
[7] 7. Y. Kannai The Core and Balancedness. In Handbook of Game Theory,
Volume 1, Editors R. Aumann and S. Hart. Elsevier Science Publishers, 1992
7
